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Abstract
In this paper I analyse a labor market where the wage is endoge-
nously determined according to a Right-to-Manage bargaining process
between a firm and a labor union whose members are partitioned into
two social groups: the old and the young. Furthermore, I exploit the
Single Mindedness theory, which considers the existence of a density
function which endogenously depends on leisure. I demonstrate that,
when preferences of the old for leisure are higher than those of the
young and when the level of productivity of the young is higher than
that of the old, the young suffer from higher tax rates and gain higher
level of wage rates and lower levels of leisure. Finally, since the old are
more single minded than the young, they exploit their greater political
power to get positive transfers from the young in a PAYG system.
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1 Introduction
In recent years the interest of economists about trade unions behavior models
has been gradually increasing. The earlier studies were principally oriented
to the macroeconomic perspective and solely intended to explain the rela-
tionship between higher wages generated by the presence of labor unions
and unemployment levels. From this point of view three models have been
competitors in attempting to explain this linkage: the monopoly model, the
Right to Manage (RTM) model and the efficient bargain model. The old-
est monopoly model was developed by Dunlop (1944); there, the union was
seen as a monopolistic seller of labor which maximized its utility function
by choosing the optimal level of wage, given the firm’s demand for labor. As
a result, the monopoly union model entails more unemployment than would
be the case under perfect labor markets and a higher level of wage rates,
with respect to the competitive wage. The RTM model was first proposed
by Leontief (1946) but it was only in the early 1980s with Nickell’s works
that it acquired its popularity. The model assumes that there exists a bar-
gaining process between a firm and a labor union over the real wage, subject
to the labor demand unilaterally chosen by the firm in maximising its profit
function. In this case, the wage derived by the bargaining process is lower
and the employment level is higher than that generated by the monopoly
union model and the RTM solution lies on the labor demand curve. The
main achievement of the RTM model is that the equilibrium wage and the
level of employment depend upon the bargaining power of the involved bar-
gainers. Finally, in the efficient bargaining model developed by McDonald
and Solow (1981) the union and the firm negotiate upon both the wage and
the level of employment. In this case, the quite surprising result is such
that the efficient contracts lie not on the labor demand curve, since both
the wage and the level of employment stand above the competitive solution.
Nevertheless, these three macroeconomic models took the bargaining power
as exogenous and did not take into account some relevant factors. First of all,
they do not consider the distinction between “insiders ”, whose preferences
count and “outsiders ”, whose preferences do not. Due to this distinction,
the union indifference curves end up to be kinked at the point where the
level of employment is equal to the membership. Secondly, the classical
macroeconomic literature took the union size as exogenously given, whilst
authors as Grossman started to investigate this issue considering the role
of the seniority within the union and the voting mechanism which max-
imises the expected utility of the median worker. From the early 1990s
many economists such as Nickell & Wadhwani (1990) and McDonald &
Suen (1992) started to analyse, from a microeconomic perspective, the role
and the determination of trade union power. This concept of trade unions,
according to McDonald and Suen ([29]) is “the ability of the trade union
to divide up to its advantage the rents arising from the production process
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given other parameters, in particular the elasticity of revenue with respect
to employment ”. Furthermore, an increasing number of economists began
to study the impact of changes in tax rates over the wage outcome from
trade union/firm bargaining. In the McDonald & Suen model, the authors
attempted to measure the trade union power both in an “open union”(or
utilitarian union) model and in an insider-outsider model. Unfortunately,
as themselves recognized, this is not an easy task. An important contribu-
tion to the doctrine was represented by the studies on Corporatism, even
though this argument is too broad to be explored in this work. In the last
decade researchers have been moving toward the analysis of new fields of
research, most of all in the political economy perspective. One of them is
represented by the organization of workers in social groups and the political
insider mechanism; according to this literature (see Gilles Saint-Paul ([14])
amongst the others) “workers may be unable to coordinate in order to form
a labor union, but by voting in favor of an institution that raises they are
able to collectively achieve a higher wage level exactly as if they were orga-
nized in a union. Labor market rigidities allow insiders to monopolize the
market at the economy wide level even though their bargaining power may
be quite reduced at a firm level ”. Secondly, even the impact of unions on
the voting behavior of their members represent an interesting field which
may provide interesting results.
In this paper, I analyse the role of labor unions from a microeconomic per-
spective, exploiting the Single-Mindedness Theory. Wages are endogenously
determined according to a typical RTM model between a firm and a labor
union which is seen as a social institution of workers partitioned into two
social groups (Young and Old). An important assumption is that the pref-
erences of the old for leisure are greater than the preferences of the young
and the level of productivity of the young is greater than the level of pro-
ductivity of the old. Under these conditions, I will demonstrate that the
tax rate of the young is higher than that of the old, whilst the wage rate
of the old is lower than that of the young and the amount of leisure for the
old is greater than the amount of leisure of the young. Since the single-
mindedness of a group, which represents a proxy for the political power of
that group, is captured by the density which is a monotonically increasing
function with respect to leisure ([5]) I conclude that the old are more able to
influence politicians and this power of influence enables them to get positive
transfers in a PAYG system. Since the Government must clear the budget
and cannot issue any debt, the burden of transfers is entirely carried by the
young. Thus, with respect to previous work of mine, this study considers
the mechanisms of labor unions, seen as an institution which represents the
interests of different social groups. Again, in accordance with the SMT, the
greater the ability of a single group to be focused on the minimum number
of issue, the higher the probability that this group achieves its goals. The
paper is organized as follows: section one introduces, section two explains
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the model, section three provides some numerical simulation and section
four concludes.
2 The model
I consider an OLG model, where individual agents live only for two periods:
the first period t represents the present and the second t+ 1 represents the
future. At time t there are two generations coexisting together: the young
and the old. I assume that the generation of the old was born old and
had not a youth. Furthermore, the generation of the young does not have
any progeny. As a consequence, the world ends at time t + 1. Generations
are unlinked, meaning that there is no possibility to leave any bequest.
Individuals consume all the available income earned at a given period of
time; thus, it is not possible neither to save nor to borrow money.
Then, let a population of size equal to one be partitioned into two discrete
groups of workers, the young and the old, each of them endowed with a given
amount of labor time (measured in hours). Thus, the space of groups is
G = {Y,O}, where Y denotes the group of young workers and O the group
of old workers. I will use index I to denote a social group, capital letters to
indicate the group and small letters to indicate single individuals belonging
to the I-th group. The size of a group does not change over time.
Each worker has to decide how to divide his time between work and
leisure, denoted by l. I assume also that leisure can be employed to attend
several activities, such as relaxing, taking care of family, participating in
political activities and many others. Thus, leisure can be seen as a vector
of N activities l = l(l1, l2, ..., lN ), where ln ≥ 0.
Labor market is imperfect and this imperfection is due to the presence
of a labor union which bargains with the firm the wage rate, according to
a typical Right-To-Manage (RTM) model. I assume that there exists only
one union and that all the workers (old and young) belong to this union,
which aims to maximize its members’ net-of-tax income and the level of
employment. The presence of this form of market imperfection generates
unemployment in equilibrium (for an introductory analysis on the effects of
trade unions on the labor markets, see Oswald ([32])).
Furthermore, I introduce one of the core assumptions of the model. I as-
sume that the old and the young are identical in every respect except three:
first of all the intrinsic value of the old workers for leisure is assumed to be
greater than the same value of the young workers; secondly, the level of pro-
ductivity of the young is higher than the level of productivity of the old. That
is, ψo >> ψy, where Greek letter psi denotes the intrinsic value for leisure
and zy >> zo, where z indicates the productivity level of a group. Thus,
the two social groups have different preferences with respect to the choice
between work and leisure. This assumption is also supported by the empir-
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ical evidence2. Furthermore, I assume that the leisure of a group generates
a positive externality to the other group; for instance, retired grandparents
often provide their sons with help by babysitting their children, and carry on
some useful activities in their sons’ place, such as house cleaning, payment
of bills and so on. Otherwise, the young helps in their spare time their par-
ents, expecially very old parents in many activities, such as bringing them to
doctors, doing shopping and so forth. Furthermore, there exist some social
beliefs which consider leisure of the old as a merit good. In modern societies,
individuals believe that the old deserve to retire after having spent an entire
life working. In this paper I assume that ϕy >> ϕo, where ϕ denotes the
magnitude of the positive externality in the worker’s utility function. That
is, leisure of the old provide more utility to the young than leisure of the
young does to the old. Finally, I assume that each worker has a personal
ideological bias for one of the two candidates, and this ideological difference
generates heterogeneity among groups. The ideological bias is exogenously
given.
Old workers’ preferences can be represented by a quasi-linear utility func-
tion3. A representative young worker at time t has the following lifetime
utility function:
Uo = cot + ψ
o log lot + ϕ
o log lyt (1)
∀ o ∈ O
where cot is the consumption at time t, l
o
t is the leisure at time t, ψ
o is a
parameter representing the intrinsic preference of the old worker for leisure
(ψo ∈ [0, 1]) and ϕo, the magnitude which leisure of the young has on the
utility of the old. The old worker consumes all his income:
cot = w
o(1− τ oLt)(tot − lot ) + bot + r(Sot ) (2)
where wo is the unitary wage per hour worked, τ oLt is the tax rate on la-
bor income, tot is the total amount of time the worker has to divide between
leisure and work, bot is an intergenerational transfer and r(S
o
t ) represents the
return which the old worker gains at the end of time t over an amount of
money he accumulated. I assume that the intergenerational transfer is repre-
sented by a typical pay-as-you-go pension program, whilst r(Sot ) represents
the quote of a mutual fund. The last day of work, the old worker withdraws
the amount of money invested. Without loss of generality, I assume that
the same day, he consumes all this amount of money and dies.
Similarly, the preferences of a representative young worker y are given
by the following lifetime utility function:
2for a survey on the factors which explain the difference in preferences toward leisure
among social groups, see Canegrati ([5])
3A quasi-linear utility function entails the non existence of the income effect
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Uy = cyt + ψ
y log lyt + ϕ
y log lot + β
y(cyt+1 + ψ
y log lyt+1) (3)
∀y ∈ Y
where cyt and c
y
t+1 represent the consumption at time t and t+1, l
y
t and
lyt+1 leisure at time t and t + 1, β
y is the time preference discount factor,
ψy is the intrinsic preference of the young worker for leisure (ψy ∈ [0, 1])
and ϕy represents the intrinsic preference of the young for leisure of the old
(ϕy ∈ [0, 1]).
Finally, the intrinsic value of leisure for the old worker is assumed to be
much higher than the intrinsic value for the young: ψo >> ψy. Without
loss of generality I assume that ψo > 12 and ψ
y < 12 . Since the young know
that at time t + 1 will be old, their utility function includes the leisure of
the next period, weighted by a discount factor βy ∈ [0, 1].
The young worker’s intertemporal budget constraint is given by:
cyt + β
ycyt+1 = w
y
t (1− τyLt)(tyt − lyt ) + byt
+r(Syt ) + β
y(wyt+1(1− lyt+1)(tyt+1 − τyLt+1) + r(Syt+1)) (4)
Notice that the young worker’s budget constraint does not contain the
term which refers to the intergenerational transfer at time t+ 1, byt+1, since
at period t + 1 there exists only generation Y and, by definition, it cannot
exist any intergenerational transfer. Furthermore, I assume that tot = t
y
t =
tyt+1 = t Furthermore, I introduce the following budget constraints:
r(Sot ) = T
o
t (5)
r(Syt ) = T
y
t (6)
r(Syt+1) = T
y
t+1 (7)
nobot + n
ybyt + α |nobot | |nybyt | = 0 (8)
(bot )(b
y
t ) < 0
Since revenues are proportional to the amount of labor supplied, the tax-
ation entails inefficiencies, since it distorts workers’ decisions on the amount
of labor supplied and determines the quota of pre-funded savings.
T ot represents total revenues generated by the taxation of the old at time
t and it is equal to noτ oLtw
o(t− lot ) while T yt the total revenues generated by
the taxation of the young at time t and it is equal to nyτyLtw
y(t− lyt ); T yt+1
represents the total revenues generated by the taxation of the young at time
t + 1 and it is equal to nyτyLt+1w
y(t − lyt+1). The condition nobot + nybyt +
α |nobot | |nybyt | = 0 assures that an intergenerational transfer exists while the
condition (bot )(b
y
t ) < 0 shows that the situation where both generations either
get a positive transfer or suffer of a negative transfer is impossible to achieve.
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In other words, if one generation obtains a positive transfer, the other one
has to finance for it. The term α |nobot | |nybyt | represents an efficiency loss
which takes place via a redistribution process and can be measured by the
amount of resources wasted during this process. For instance, one may think
that this loss is due to the existence of bureaucracy costs or to rent grabbed
by politicians. The parameter α ∈ [0, 1] represents the measure of the loss
which is quadratic in the transfers.
2.1 The Government
The literature has used different formulation for the Government’s objective
function. A typical normative approach considers a benevolent Government
which aims to maximize a Social Utility Function by choosing the optimal
tax rate on labor, subject to a budget constraint where tax revenues are
equal to public good expenditures. Otherwise, some authors such as Ed-
wards and Keen considers a Leviathan model where, referring to the famous
milestone paper by Brennan and Buchanan [4], they examine a Government
which is concerned in part with maximizing the size of the public sector.
Furthermore, the Edwards and Keen model assumes that the Government
retains some degree of benevolence, perhaps because it has re-election con-
cerns. Nevertheless, this concerns were not formally modelled.
In this paper, I provide a possible explanation to this issue, introducing
a political economy model where politicians act in order to maximize the
probability of being re-elected.
A public policy vector is given by:
~q = (τ oLt, τ
y
Lt, b
o
t , b
y
t )
composed of two tax rates and two intergenerational transfers.
Finally, the Government is committed to clear the budget constraint;
this means that it cannot transfer more resources than those collected by
taxing individuals at every period of time. Thus, I assume that the Budget
Surplus (Deficit) must be equal to zero. Since the Government cannot issue
bonds to collect more financial resources and can only rely on taxation, the
increase in a social group’s welfare entails the decrease in the welfare of the
other social group, since the latter has to pay for the transfer to the former.
2.1.1 The union
Denoting by n the total members of the union which coincide with the
population (in the sense that I assume that every citizen belongs to the
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union4), denoting by no the number of old workers, by ny the number of
young workers, by wo(1− τ oLt) the net-of-tax wage rate of the old, and by
wy(1− τyLt) the net-of-tax wage rate of the young, the expected utility of a
representative member is:
U(w, l) = noU(wo(1− τ oLt)) + nyU(wy(1− τyLt)) (9)
and I assume that the workers are risk neutral, so that
U(wi(1− τ iLt)) = wi(1− τ iLt)
Thus, the objective function of the union can be written as follows:
U(w, l) = Lowo(1− τ oLt) + Lywy(1− τyLt) (10)
where Lo is the total level of old workers’ employment and Ly is the total
level of young workers’ employment.
2.1.2 The firm problem
I assume that the firm maximizes the following objective function:
Π(w,Lo, Ly) = R(Lo) +R(Ly)−
∑
I=y,o
wI(1 + τ ILt)L
I (11)
where R(Lo) and R(Ly) represent the total revenues generated by the
old and the young, respectively. Furthermore, I assume that the firm is a
price-taker, selling the product at a price p, which I normalize to unity. The
production function is represented by y(Lo, Ly) = (zoLo − (Lo)2) + (zyLy −
(Ly)2), where z represents a productivity parameter and I assume that zy >
zo. Notice that R(0) = 0, that ∂y∂L > 0,∀L < z2 and that ∂
2y
∂2L
= −2 < 0 (y is
a concave function).
Thus, the firm’s objective function is given by:
Π(wo, wy, Lo, Ly) = (zoLo−(Lo)2)+(zyLy−(Ly)2)−woLo(1+τoLt)−wyLy(1+τyLt) (12)
2.1.3 A five-stage game
I consider a non cooperative five-stage game among two candidates, a trade
union representing the two social groups and a corporation. In the first
stage the two candidates announce their fiscal policy vector, by choosing
the optimal level of labor tax rate τLt and the optimal transfers. In the
second, elections take place. In the third, individuals choose the optimal
4This assumption is fundamental to assure that the union utility function is correctly
specified; otherwise, if we assume that not every worker belong to the union, it could
be possible that the employment level n exceed membership m. In this case, the correct
specification for the utility function of the union would be U(w, l) = noU(wo(1− τoLt)) +
nyU(wy(1− τyLt)))max[0, no −mo]− U(wy(1− τyLt))max[0, ny −my]
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level of leisure, taken the policy vector chosen by the Government as given.
Thus, multiplying the labour chosen by the representative worker by the
numerosity of the group, we obtain the Labour Offer Function. The other
two stages are typical of the classic Nickell’s Right-to-Manage model. In the
fourth stage the firm independently bargains over the wages with the labor
union, given the pre-determined fiscal policy vector chosen by Government
in the first stage; thus, the optimal wage rate is determined by a bargain-
ing process between the trade union and the corporation and the resulting
outcome derives by an asymmetric Nash bargaining. The Nash bargaining
maximand is a weighted function Ω of the firm and union objective functions
and can be written as follows:
Ωt = λ log [U(w,L
o
t , L
y
t )] + (1− λ) log [Π(wo, wy, Lo, Ly)− ı¯] (13)
where the parameter λ denotes the relative bargaining power of the trade
union (0 ≤ λ ≤ 1) and ı¯ the fall back position of the firm. Without loss of
generality I impose that ı¯ = 0.
Finally, in the fifth stage the firm sets its output, given the pre-determined
wage choices from the fourth stage, as to maximize profits. The assumption
that the LOF is determined before the LDF means that workers have a sort
of advantage of first move, or in another words, they act as a Stackelber
leader. This assumption is strong since usually one is prone to think that
workers have not decision power over the level of work. What I argue here is
that this could be true in the Short Run, where the macroeconomic, legisla-
tive and political environments are given and thus firms decide according to
efficiency criterion. But in the Long Run these environments change: new
labor laws are passed by the new governments and if we assume that a law
is a synthesis of policies that politicians are committed to undertake and, as
we assumed, politicians commit only to policies which are more likely to be
voted, the result is that labor policies which affect the level of employment
are chosen by society. Thus, the firm is assumed to have a complete control
over the level of employment but only in the Short Run; it observes the
economic, political and normative environments and then derives the LDF
bargaining wages with the labor union.
To solve the model I use the backward induction.
I start to solve the model from the fifth stage by deriving the optimal la-
bor demand of the firm, obtained by the maximization of the profit function
with respect to the labor:
Γ ≡ Π(wo, wy, Lo, Ly) = (zoLo− (Lo)2)+ (zyLy− (Ly)2)−woLo(1+ τoLt)−wyLy(1+ τyLt)
(14)
Solving Γ, we obtain the optimal labor demand functions for the corpo-
rate:
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Ly∗t = L
y
t (w
y, τyLt, z
y) =
zy − wy(1 + τyLt)
2
(15)
Lo∗t = L
o
t (w
o, τ oLt, z
o) =
zo − wo(1 + τ oLt)
2
(16)
Substituting (15) and (16) into (14) I provide an expression for the In-
direct Profit Function:
Π∗(wo, wy, Lo∗t , L
y∗
t ) = Π(w
o, wy, Lyt (w
y, τyLt, z
y), Lot (w
o, τ oLt, z
o)) =
∑
I=O,Y
(zI (zI − wI(1 + τ ILt)
2
)
−
(
zI − wI(1 + τ ILt)
2
)2
−
∑
I=O,Y
wI(1 + τ ILt)
(
zI − wI(1 + τ ILt)
2
)
(17)
Furthermore, substituting (15) and (16) into (10), we obtain an expres-
sion for the Indirect Utility Function of the union:
U(w, l) =
∑
I=O,Y
(
zI − wI(1 + τ ILt)
2
)
wI(1− τ ILt) (18)
In the fourth stage of the game the firm and the union bargain over the
optimal wage rate, which is determined by the resolution of the following
problem:
max
wo,wy
Ω = λ log
[
Ut(L
y∗
t , L
o∗
t , w
o, wy)
]
+
(1− λ) log [Πt(wo, wy, Lo∗t , Ly∗t )]
s.t. R′(Lot )− wo(1 + τLot ) = 0
R′(Ly)− wy(1 + τLy) = 0
The constraints impose that the bargain’s outcome must stand on the
firm’s labor demand functions.
Then, substituting (17) and (18) into the maximand we obtain:
max
wo,wy
Ωt = λ log
[ ∑
I=O,Y
(
zI − wI(1 + τ ILt)
2
)
wI(1− τ ILt)
]
+
(1−λ) log
[ ∑
I=O,Y
(
zI
(
zI − wI(1 + τ ILt)
2
)
−
(
zI − wI(1 + τ ILt)
2
)2)
−
∑
I=O,Y
wI(1 + τ ILt)
(
zI − wI(1 + τ ILt)
2
)]
Solving this equation maximization problem is not an easy task. Any-
way, one may easily note that Ωt may be written as λ log(U(zo, wo, τ o) +
U(zy, wy, τy)) + (1− λ) log(Π(zo, wo, τ o) + Π(zy, wy, τy)) and that
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U (zo, wo, τ o |wo=wy ,zo=zy ,τo=τy) = U (zy, wy, τy)∀y
U (zy, wy, τy |wy=wo,zy=zo,τy=τo) = U (zo, wo, τ o)∀o
Π(zo, wo, τ o |wo=wy ,zo=zy ,τo=τy) = Π (zy, wy, τy)∀y
Π(zy, wy, τy |wy=wo,zy=zo,τy=τo) = Π (zo, wo, τ o)∀o
Substituting and solving the problem we obtain the optimal wage rate:
wo∗ =
zoλ
2(1 + τ o)
(19)
wy∗ =
zyλ
2(1 + τy)
(20)
It can be seen that the optimal wage is increasing both in the level of
productivity and in the bargaining power of the union. The second result
underlines how a powerful union is able to obtain higher levels of wage in a
easier manner.
At this point some considerations are useful. If the bargain is (Pareto) effi-
cient the optimal solution (wI∗, LI∗t ) must stands over the so called contract
curve (CC), which represents the locus of tangency points between a union’s
indifference curve and a firm’s isoprofit curve defined by the following con-
dition:
(V (w)− u¯)/V ′(w) = w (1 + τLt)−R′(Lt)
(see equation 3 in MacDonald & Solow, 1981).
Unfortunately, it can be demonstrated (see Manning, 1987) that the
MacDonald & Solow efficient bargain solution can be only achieved under
very strict conditions; in other words the efficient solution holds if and only
if the measure of the union’s influence over employment is exactly equal to
the union’s influence over wage. Whenever this condition is not verified, the
bargaining outcome produces an inefficient result in which the equilibrium
(w∗t , L∗t ) stays leftwards with respect to the CC. In a RTMmodel the measure
of the union’s influence over employment is exactly equal to zero and the
union’s influence over the wage is less than one (or equal to one in the
monopoly union special case). As a consequence, an RTM model leads to
an inefficient equilibrium.
Finally, substituting (19) and (20) into (15) and (16) we get an expression
for the optimal labor demand functions:
Lo(wo∗) =
zo
(
1− λ2
)
2
(21)
Ly(wy∗) =
zy
(
1− λ2
)
2
(22)
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We can see that the optimal wage rate is higher than the wage rate de-
rived in a labor market characterized by perfect competition and absence of
unions (in other words when ΠIt = 0 for every I and λ = 0) and the em-
ployment level is lower than the competitive level. Thus, the RTM solution
stands on the labor demand curve, but in a point where the wage rate is
higher and the employment level is lower than the competitive solution case.
We can conclude that the wage bargaining determines a Pareto inefficient
solution, which is not represented by a point where the isoprofit curve of the
firm is tangent to the union indifference curve.
Proposition 1 The optimal wage deriving from a RTM bargaining between
the firm and the labor union, w∗, increases with respect to an increase in the
union bargaining power λ and in the productivity factor z, whilst it decreases
with respect to an increase in the marginal tax rate τ ILt.
Proof : (see Appendix B).
Proposition 2 in a RTM model the existence of a labor union entails an
equilibrium characterized by an higher wage rate and a lower level of em-
ployment with respect to model where the firm has the exclusive power to
determine both of the variables.
Proof : It can be seen that the co-domain of the wage function w = f(λ)
is between 0, when λ = 0 and z2(1+τ) , when λ = 1. Note also that the
co-domain of the employment function L = f(λ) is between z2 , when λ = 0
and z4 , when λ = 1.
In the third stage, a representative old worker solves the following optimiza-
tion problem:
maxUo = cot + ψ
o log lot + ϕ
o log lyt
s.t. cot =
(
zoλ
2(1 + τ o)
)
(1− τ oLt)(t− lot ) + bot + r(Sot )
Solving with respect to lot I obtain an expression for the optimal leisure:
lo∗t =
ψo
( zoλ2(1+τo))(1− τ oLt)
(23)
I do the same for the representative young worker:
max Uy = cyt + ψ
y log lyt + ϕ
y log lot + β
y(cyt+1 + ψ
y log lyt+1)
s.t. cyt + β
ycyt+1 =
(
zyλ
2(1 + τy)
)
(1− τyLt)(t− lyt ) + byt + r(Syt )
12
+βy
((
zyλ
2(1 + τy)
)
(1− τyLt)(t− lyt+1)(1− τyLt+1) + r(Syt+1)
)
ly∗t =
ψy
( zyλ2(1+τy))(1− τyLt)
(24)
Substituting (23) and (24) into (1) and (3) I obtain an expression for the
IUF of the old and the young:
V ot = t
(
zoλ
2(1 + τ o)
)
(1− τ oLt)− ψo + bot + r(Sot ) + ψo logψo
−ψo log
(
zoλ
2(1 + τ o)
)
− ψo log(1− τ oLt)
+ϕo logψy − ϕo log
(
zyλ
2(1 + τy)
)
− ϕo log(1− τyLt) (25)
V yt = t
(
zyλ
2(1 + τyLt)
)
(1− τyLt)− ψy + byt + r(Syt )+
+βy
(
t
(
zyλ
2(1 + τyLt+1)
)
(1− τyLt+1)− ψy + r(Syt+1)
)
+
+ϕy logψo−ϕy log
(
zoλ
2(1 + τ o)
)
−ϕy log(1−τ oLt)+βyψy log
(
2ψy(1 + τyt+1)
zyλ(1− τyt+1)
)
(26)
In the second stage of the game elections take place. It is easy to verify
that the elections’ outcome is a tie. The proof arises from the resolution
of the first stage, where it will be demonstrated that in equilibrium, both
parties choose an identical policy vector.
In the first stage, the two candidates choose their policy vectors. They
face exactly the same optimization problem and maximize their share of
votes or, equivalently, the probability of winning. The resolution is made
for candidate A, but it also holds for candidate B.
max piA =
1
2
+
∑
I={o,y}
nIsI [V i(~qA)− V i(~qB)]
s.t. T1 ≡ r(Sot ) = T ot
T2 ≡ r(Syt ) = T yt
T3 ≡ r(Syt+1) = T yt+1
T4 ≡ nobot + nybyt + α |nobot | |nybyt | = 0
T5 ≡ bot byt < 0
In the Appendix C I provide a complete resolution to the problem.
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Proposition 3 In equilibrium both candidates’ policy vectors converge to
the same platform; that is ~qA = ~qB = ~q∗
Proof : ~q∗ represents the policy which captures the highest number of swing
voters. Suppose instead there exists other two policies ~q′ and ~q′′; in moving
from ~q∗ to ~q′ (or ~q′′) a candidate loses more swing voters than those it is
able to gain. Thus, suppose a starting point where candidate A chooses ~q′
and candidate B chooses ~q′′ such that by choosing ~q′ and ~q′′ the elections
outcome is a tie. If one candidate moved toward ~q∗, it would be able to gain
more swing voters than those it loses and thus, it would win the elections.
So, choosing any policy but ~q∗ cannot be an optimal answer. The only one
policy which represents a Nash Equilibrium is ~q∗ since it is the intersection
between the optimal answers of the two candidates and no one candidate
has an incentive to deviate. Since each candidate maximizes its share of
votes, in equilibrium the two candidates receive both one half of votes; if
one candidate should receive less than one half of votes it would always have
the possibility to adopt the platform chosen by the other candidate and get
the same number of votes.
Corollary 1 The utility levels reached by workers are the same; that is:
V i(qA) = V i(qB)
Proposition 4 The marginal tax rates are positive both for the young and
for the old, but the marginal tax rate of the young is higher than the marginal
tax rate of the old; that is τyLt(λ, ψ
y, zy) > τ oLt(λ, ψ
o, zo).
Proof : simulations performed with Mathematica; results available upon re-
quest to the author.
The comparative statics shows that: ∂τ
I
Lt
∂λ < 0,
∂τILt
∂ψI
< 0, ∂τ
I
Lt
∂zI
< 0,
∂τILt
∂nI
< 0, ∂τ
I
Lt
∂n−I > 0,
∂τILt
∂sI
< 0, ∂τ
I
Lt
∂s−I > 0,
∂τILt
∂ϕ−I > 0.
5
These results show how an increase in the numerosity and the density
of a group reduce the tax rate of the other group, whilst an increase in the
numerosity and density of the group entails an increase in the tax rate of
the the other group.
Proposition 5 The old offer a lower supply of labor than the young due to
the difference between lot and l
y
t .
Proof : Evidence provided by simulation with Mathematica. Results are
shown in Appendix C.
5These results were obtained via numerical simulations. Results are available upon
request to the author.
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Corollary 2 The old workers are more single minded than the young (so >
sy).
Proof : τ oLt < τ
y
Lt = 0 and ψ
o >> ψy but eventually lo∗t > l
y∗
t . Since the
density is a positive function of l so = s(lot ) > s
y = s(lyt ).
Proposition 6 There exists Social Security transfers from the young to the
old. That is: bot > 0 and b
y
t < 0.
Proof : From the first order conditions with respect to bot and b
y
t , it is:
so
sy =
1−αnybyt
1−αnobot . From Corollary 2, s
o = s(lot ) > s
ly = s(lyt ) it must be
1−αnybyt > 1−αnobot for the workers. Since αnobot > αnybyt , under conditions
bot b
y
t < 0, and α, n
o, ny it must be that bot > 0 and b
y
t < 0. The equilibrium
levels of the transfers between the young and the old are the following:
byt =
1−
√
so
sy
αny
(27)
bot =
1−
√
sy
so
αlno
(28)
byt+1 = 0 (29)
Given the budget constraint: nobot =
−nybyt
1−αnybyt taking into account the equi-
librium conditions s
o
sy =
1−αnybyt
1−αnobot , it is
so
sy =
1−αnybyt
αny
b
y
t
1−αnyby
t
+1
= (1 − αnybyt )2.
Solving with respect to byt and b
o
t we obtain the optimal values. Furthermore,
since at time t + 1 only the young generation exists, there does not exist
any intergenerational transfer, by definition. Notice that when densities of
both groups are the same, transfers are equal to zero; that is if so = sy, then
bo = by = 0.
Proposition 7 A transfer in the I-th group decreases with an increase in
the amount of resources distorted by government and with an increase in the
density of the other group, whilst it increases with an increase in the density
of his own group.
Proof : Calculating the total differentials, we obtain: ∂b
I
t
∂α < 0,
∂bIt
∂sI
> 0,
∂bIt
∂s−I < 0.
Proposition 5 makes sense and spouses the SMT: the higher the homo-
geneity among a group, the higher the power of influence of that group on
the Government and the higher the transfer that the group gets.
Proposition 8 The optimal Lagrange multipliers assume the following val-
ues:
λ∗ =
√
sosy (30)
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Proof : λ = n
oso
no−nonyαbyt =
so
1−nyαbyt =
sy
1−noαbot
Substituting the optimal intergenerational transfers value we obtain:λ∗.
The Lagrange multiplier has a political meaning since it represents the
increase in the probability of winning for a candidate, if it had an additional
dollar available to spend on redistribution.
3 Numerical Simulations
Appendix C shows the result of numerical simulations performed withMath-
ematica 5.2. The parameters matrix is a 12x11, whilst the outocome matrix
is 11x11. As a premise, I would like to underline that these simulations are
not intended to provide numbers perfectly adherent to the real world but
only to numerically demonstrate what it is stated in the propositions of the
model. I start to analyse what I will call the status quo situation given by
the parameters vector:
{no, ny , so, sy , zo, zy , λ, ψo, ψy , ϕo, ϕy , t} = {0.5, 0.5, 0.006, 0.004, 0.2, 0.5, 0.45, 0.4, 0.25, 1, 0.8, 40}
The results vector confirms the propositions of the model. The tax rate
of the young is equal to 0.814 whilst the tax rate of the old is equal to 0.621,
confirming what it is stated in Proposition 4. The wage rate of the young
is nearly double than the wage of the old, whilst the leisure of the old is
much more greater than the leisure of the young. The Demand of Labour
is higher for the young but so is also the level of unemployment. The total
unemployment is equal to 9.856.
1. An increse in the bargaining power of the labor union. All the other
variables being equal, an increase in the bargaining power of the la-
bor union provokes a general decrease in the taxation of both groups.
Indeed, the tax rate of the old fells from 0.621396 when λ is equal to
0.45 to 0.609347 when λ is equal to 0.5 and 0.594811 when λ is equal
to 0.55. The same holds for the tax rate of the young which fells from
0.814036 to 0.809401 and 0.804147 rispectivly. Otherwise, the wage
rate increases for both groups but this generates an increase in the
labor supply, since leisure shrinks from 21.6772 to 18.9865 (λ = 0.5)
and 16.7486 (λ = 0.55) for the group of the young and from 38.0672
to 32.9571 (λ = 0.5) and 28.6252 (λ = 0.55) for the group of the old.
As a consequence, the unemployment increases in both groups (and so
does the overall level of unemployment (13.7657 λ = 0.5 with 17.0593
λ = 0.55). This simple exercise confirms the assumption that if the
union does not have any control on the level of employment but it aims
only to get an higher wage, the labor market suffers with a reduction
in the level of employment.
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2. An increase in the level of productivity. A change in the level of pro-
ductivity of one group generates a decrease in the tax rate of that
group (whilst the tax rate of the other group remains equal) and an
increase in the wage rate. The supply of labor increases for the old,
but since it is not matched by and adeguate increase in the labor de-
mand, this generates an increase in the unemployment level for the
old group. In the numerical simulation I analyse both an increase in
the level of productivity of the old (from 0.2 to 0.25) and of the young
(from 0.5 to 0.7).
3. An increase in the preferences of a group for his own leisure In this
case, the tax rate of that group whose preferences for leisure have
increased decreases and so does the wage rate. The level of leisure
increases as well whilst the total level of unemployment of the old and
the overall level of umeployment fells.
4. An increase in the preferences of a group for leisure of the other group.
An increase in the preferences of the old for leisure of the young entails
a decrease in the tax rate, an increase in the wage and an increase in
the labour supply by the group of the old. Since the demand for labor
remains steady, this means that the overall level of unempoloyment
increases. Otherwise, an in increase in the preferences of the young
for leisure of the old resolves in an increase in the wage rate, a reduction
in the wage and a reduction of the supply of labor and a slight decrease
in the oveall unemployment.
5. An increase in the numerosity of a group An increase in the numerosity
of a group entails a general decrease in the tax rate and an icnrease
in the wage of that group whilsts it provokes an increase in the tax
rate and a decrease in the wage of the other group. The level of
leisure decreases for the group whose numerosity has grown whilst it
increase for the other group. Otherwise, the level of unemployment
increases due to the increase of the numerosity of the group whilst
in decreases in the other group. Anyway the overall effect on the
employment of society is uncertain. If the increase happens in the
group of the old (in the simulation the percentage of the old increases
from 0.5 to 0.55 whilst the percentage of the young shrinks from 0.5
to 0.45) the overall level of unemployment increases, whilst the vice-
versa holds if the increases happens in the group of the old (in this
case the percentage of the old decreases from 0.5 to 0.49 whilst the
percentage of the young surges from 0.5 to 0.51. This exercise shows
the danger of an increase in the population of the old that modern
societies are experimenting. Since the old become more powerful from
a political point of view, they succed to obtain lower levels of taxation
and higher. Otherwise, the young are less numerous and they have to
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carry the burden of the entire social security system: they pay more
taxes, the have low levels of wages and they have also to pay for the
pension transfers.
4 Conclusions
In this model, I applied the Single-Mindedness theory to the labor market,
where wages are endogenously determined according to a Right-to-Manage
bargaining model. I analysed a society composed by two groups of workers
(the old and the young) which belong to a labor union and a firm. I assumed
also that the preferences of the old for leisure are greater than the prefer-
ences of the young and that the level of productivity of the young is greater
that the level of productivity of the old. Under these conditions, I demon-
strated that the tax rate of the young is greater than that of the old whilst
the wage rate of the old is lower than that of the young and the amount of
leisure for the old is greater than the amount of leisure of the young. Since
the single-mindedness of a group, which represents a proxy for the political
power of that group, is captured by the density which is a monotonically
increasing function with respect to leisure, I conclude that the old have a
great power of influence onto politicians. This power enables them to get
positive transfers in a PAYG system, whose burden is entirely carried by
the young. Thus, with respect to the previous work, this study consider the
mechanisms of labor unions, seen as an institution representing the interests
of different social groups. Again, according to the Single-Mindedness theory,
the greater the ability of a single group to be oriented toward the minimum
number of issue, the higher the probability that this group achieves its goals.
Nevertheless, this work does not consider some aspects which would deserve
to be analysed. First of all, it would be interesting to consider more in de-
tails, the mechanisms which are undertaken by unions to take their decisions
(i.e. voting process, elections and so forth). Furthermore, since an imperfect
labor market entails unemployment in equilibrium, it would be interesting
to add some new social groups (i.e. the unemployed) to analyse the impact
of labor unions on excluded workers. I hope this suggestions will find a place
in future researches.
5 Appendix A
In this Appendix I provide a complete resolution for the Second Order Conditions. First of all,
notice that Ω(wo, wy) is a strictly concave function if:
D2Ω(wo, wy) =
(
Ωoo(wo,wy) Ωoy(wo,wy)
Ωyo(wo,wy) Ωyy(wo,wy)
)
is negative definite for all (wo, wy).
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This is true if and only if∣∣Ωoo(wo,wy)∣∣ < 0 and ∣∣∣ Ωoo(wo,wy) Ωoy(wo,wy)Ωyo(wo,wy) Ωyy(wo,wy) ∣∣∣ > 0
or equivalently, if and only if
Ωoo(wo,wy) < 0 and Ωoo(wo,wly)Ωyy(wo,wy) − [Ωoy(wo,wy)]2 > 0
It is easy to verify that:
∂2Ωt
∂2wo
= λ(θ1
<0︷ ︸︸ ︷
(
∂2(log(Uo(wo, τoLt, b
o
t )))
∂2wo
)+ (1− θ1 − θ2)
<0︷ ︸︸ ︷
(
∂2(log(U l(wo, wy , τoLt, τ
y
Lt, δ
o, δy)))
∂2wo
))+
(1− λ)
<0︷ ︸︸ ︷
(
∂2 log Π(wo, wy , Lyt (w
y , τyLt), L
o
t (w
o, τoLt))
∂2wo
) < 0
The same holds for
∂2Ωt
∂2wy
= λ(θ1
<0︷ ︸︸ ︷
(
∂2(log(Uy(wly , τyLt, b
ly
t )))
∂2wy
)+ (1−θ1−θ2)
<0︷ ︸︸ ︷
(
∂2(log(U l(wo, wy , τoLt, τ
y
Lt, δ
o, δy)))
∂2wy
))+
(1− λ)
<0︷ ︸︸ ︷
(
∂2 log Π(wo, wy , Lyt (w
y , τyLt), L
o
t (w
o, τoLt))
∂2wy
) < 0
Finally
∂2Ωt
∂wo∂wy
=
∂2Ωt
∂wy∂wo
= λ(θ1
>0︷ ︸︸ ︷
(
∂2(log(Uo(wo, τoLt, b
o
t )))
∂wo
∂wy)+
(1− θ1 − θ2)
>0︷ ︸︸ ︷
(
∂2(log(U l(wo, wy , τoLt, τ
y
Lt, δ
o, δy)))
∂wo
∂wy))+
(1− λ)
>0︷ ︸︸ ︷
(
∂2 log Π(wo, wy , Lyt (w
y , τyLt), L
o
t (w
o, τoLt))
∂wo
∂wy) > 0
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6 Appendix B
In this appendix I provide a demonstration of Proposition 1. I derive the optimal wage rate,
wI∗ = z
Iλ
2(1+τI )
with respect to λ and I obtain:
∂wI∗
∂λ
=
z
2(1 + τILt)
which is easy to verify, is always greater than zero.
Secondly, I derive the optimal wage rate with respect to the parameter z:
∂wI∗
∂z
=
λ
2(1 + τILt)
which again is always greater than zero.
Finally, I derive the optimal wage rate with respect to the marginal tax rate:
∂wI∗
∂τILt
= − zλ
2(1 + x)2
which is always negative.
7 Appendix C
In this Appendix I provide a complete resolution to the candidates’ problem. The two
candidates face exactly the same optimization problem; they maximize their share of votes
or, equivalently, the probability of winning. The resolution is made for candidate A, but
it also holds for candidate B.
max piA =
1
2
+
∑
I={o,y}
nIsI [V i(~qA)− V i(~qB)]
s.t. T1 ≡ r(Sot ) = T ot
T2 ≡ r(Syt ) = T yt
T3 ≡ r(Syt+1) = T yt+1
T4 ≡ nobot + nybyt + α |nybyt | |nobot | = 0
T5 ≡ bot byt < 0
where: sI = sI(l(τLt, w))
I substitute T1, T2 and T3 into the IUF of individuals and I write the Lagrangian function:
L =
1
2
+
∑
I={o,y}
nIsI [V i(~qA)− V i(~qB)] + λ (T4)
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T ot = n
o
(
tτoLtw
o − τ
o
Ltψ
o
(1− τoLt)
)
(31)
T lyt = n
y
(
tτyLtw
y − τ
y
Ltψ
y
(1− τyLt)
)
(32)
T yt+1 = n
y
(
tτyLt+1w
y − τ
y
Lt+1ψ
y
(1− τyLt+1)
)
(33)
Substituting wI∗ = z
Iλ
2(1+τI )
into equation (31), (32) and (33) we obtain:
T ot = n
o
(
tτoLt(
zoλ
2(1 + τoLt)
)− τ
o
Ltψ
o
(1− τoLt)
)
(34)
T yt = n
y
(
tτyLt(
zyλ
2(1 + τyLt)
)− τ
y
Ltψ
y
(1− τyLt)
)
(35)
T yt+1 = n
y
(
tτyLt+1(
zyλ
2(1 + τyLt+1)
)− τ
y
Lt+1ψ
y′
(1− τyLt+1)
)
(36)
I write the First Order Conditions:
(1) ∂L
∂τo
Lt
= noso ∂V
o
∂τo
Lt
+ nysy ∂V
y
∂τo
Lt
= 0
(2) ∂L
∂τ
y
Lt
= nysy ∂V
y
∂τ
y
L
+ noso ∂V
o
∂τ
y
Lt
= 0
(3) ∂L
∂bo
t
= noso = µ(no − nonyαlbo)
(4) ∂L
∂b
y
t
= nysy = µ(ny − nynoαlbo)
(5)
∑
I=LO,LY
(nibit) + α
l
∣∣nloblot ∣∣ ∣∣nlyblyt ∣∣ = 0
µ ≥ 0
And solving we obtain:
(1)sono(−
tzoλ+
2(1+τo)(3τo−1)ψo
(τo−1)2
2(1+τo2)
) + syny( 2ϕ
y
1−τ2o ) = 0
(2)syny(−
tzyλ+
2(1+τy)(3τy−1)ψy
(τy−1)2
2(1+τy2)
) + sono( 2ϕ
o
1−τ2y ) = 0
(3) ∂L
∂bo
t
= noso = µ(no − nonyαlby)
(4) ∂L
∂b
y
t
= nysy = µ(ny − nynoαlbo)
(5)
∑
I=O,Y
(nibit) + α
l |nobot | |nybyt | = 0
µ ≥ 0
Solving (1) and (2) we derive the optimal tax rates (one of the two roots is not
accettable):
τo∗Lt =
tnosozoλ− 2nosoψo + 2√2
√
2n2ys2yϕ2y − tn2os2ozoλψo + 4nonysosyϕyψo + 2n2os2oψ2o
tnosozoλ+ 4nysyϕy + 6nosoψo
s.t.
{
t, no, so, zo, ny , sy , λ, ϕy , ψo ∈ <7|
2n2ys2yϕ2y−tn2os2ozoλψo+4nonysosyϕyψo+2n2os2oψ2o ≥ 0, tnosozoλ+4nysyϕy+6nosoψo 6= 0
τy∗Lt =
tnysyzyλ− 2nysyψy + 2√2
√
2n2os2oϕ2o − tn2ys2yzyλψy + 4nynosysoϕoψy + 2n2ys2yψ2y
tnysyzyλ+ 4nosoϕo + 6nysyψy
s.t.
{
t, ny , sy , zy , no, so, λ, ϕo, ψy ∈ <7|
2n2os2oϕ2o−tn2ys2yzyλψy+4nynosysoϕoψy+2n2ys2yψ2y ≥ 0, tnysyzyλ+4nosoϕo+6nysyψy 6= 0
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The parameters matrix is a 12x11:
no = {0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.55, 0.49}
ny = {0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.45, 0.51}
so = {0.006, 0.006, 0.006, 0.006, 0.006, 0.006, 0.006, 0.006, 0.006, 0.006, 0.006}
sy = {0.004, 0.004, 0.004, 0.004, 0.004, 0.004, 0.004, 0.004, 0.004, 0.004, 0.004}
zo = {0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.25, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2}
zy = {0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.7, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5}
λ = (0.45, 0.5, 0.55, 0.45, 0.45, 0.45, 0.45, 0.45, 0.45, 0.45, 0.45}
ψo = {0.4, 0.4, 0.4, 0.4, 0.4, 0.45, 0.4, 0.4, 0.4, 0.4, 0.4}
ψy = {0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.3, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25}
ϕo = {0.8, 0.8, 0.8, 0.8, 0.8, 0.8, 0.8, 0.8, 0.85, 0.8, 0.8}
ϕy = {1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0.95, 1, 1, 1}
t = {40, 40, 40, 40, 40, 40, 40, 40, 40, 40, 40}
The outcomes matrix is a 11x11:
τoLt = {0.621396, 0.609347, 0.594811, 0.590644, 0.621396, 0.595993, 0.621396, 0.621396, 0.604559, 0.546086, 0.633736}
τyLt = {0.814036, 0.809401, 0.804147, 0.814036, 0.793924, 0.814036, 0.781714, 0.825828, 0.814036, 0.849237, 0.80554}
wo = {0.0277539, 0.0310685, 0.0344869, 0.035363, 0.0277539, 0.0281956, 0.0277539, 0.0277539, 0.0280451, 0.0291058, 0.0275442}
wy = {0.0620164, 0.0690836, 0.0762133, 0.0620164, 0.0877964, 0.0620164, 0.0631415, 0.0616159, 0.0620164, 0.0608359, 0.0623082}
lo = {38.0672, 32.9571, 28.6252, 27.6318, 38.0672, 39.5041, 38.0672, 38.0672, 36.068, 30.2766, 39.6493}
ly = {21.6772, 18.9865, 16.7486, 21.6772, 13.8177, 21.6772, 21.7661, 23.2954, 21.6772, 27.2574, 20.6331}
Lo = {0.0775, 0.075, 0.0725, 0.096875, 0.0775, 0.0775, 0.0775, 0.0775, 0.0775, 0.0775, 0.0775}
Ly = {0.19375, 0.1875, 0.18125, 0.19375, 0.27125, 0.19375, 0.19375, 0.19375, 0.19375, 0.19375, 0.19375}
Uo = {0.8889, 3.44647, 5.61491, 6.0872, 0.8889, 0.170451, 0.8889, 0.8889, 1.8885, 5.27035, 0.0943629}
Uy = {8.96765, 10.3193, 11.4444, 8.96765, 12.8199, 8.96765, 8.92321, 8.15856, 8.96765, 5.54041, 9.68337}
Uo+y = {9.85655, 13.7657, 17.0593, 15.0548, 13.7088, 9.1381, 9.81211, 9.04746, 10.8561, 10.8108, 9.77773}
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